We study multiline insurance companies with limited liability. Insurance premiums are determined by no-arbitrage principles. The results are developed under the realistic assumption that the losses created by insurer default are allocated among policyholders following an ex post, pro rata, sharing rule. In general, the ratio of default costs to expected claims, and thus the ratio of premiums to expected claims, vary across insurance lines. Moreover, capital and related costs are allocated across lines in proportion to each line's share of a digital default option on the insurer. Our results expand and generalize those derived elsewhere in the literature.
to policyholder claims based on each claimant's share of the total claims. This rule has sensible properties and generally reflects the actual practice, as discussed below.
The risk of default by insurance firms has recently been highlighted by the precarious position of the so-called "monoline" bond and mortgage security insurers as a result of the subprime mortgage crisis. These insurers are monoline in that insurance laws prohibit them from offering various consumer lines such as homeowner and auto insurance. 1 The insurers are "multiline," however, in the sense that they provide coverage against the default risk of a wide range of debt issues, including individual mortgages, securitizations such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations, and debt issued by entities such as state and local governments. Given the potentially high default rates on these debt issues and the limited capital of the insurers, it is quite possible that these insurers will be unable to pay all of the claims they face.
A similar issue of insurer default risk arises with investment banks that function as the counterparties on derivative securities for a wide range of underlying instruments, including foreign exchange, interest rate swaps and options, and credit default swaps. Our results for pricing and capital allocations can be interpreted as applying to such security insurers and derivative counterparties, as well as more traditional insurance firms.
Most of our analysis can be carried out and understood under the simplifying assumption that there is no (excess) cost associated with holding capital within the firm. This is in the same spirit as Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998) . In practice, costs of internal capital appear to be important. For example, Froot, Scharsfstein, and Stein (1993) emphasize the importance of capital market imperfections for understanding a variety of corporate risk management decisions: the tax disadvantages to holding capital within a firm is an especially common and important factor. We therefore generalize our results to the situation when there are costs associated with holding internal capital.
The article is organized as follows. In the "Literature Review" section we give a review of related literature. In the "A Competitive Multiline Insurance Market" section we introduce the basic framework for our analysis. In the "Pricing Across Lines" section we analyze the pricing of insurance across lines for a multiline insurance company, and in the "Capital Allocation Across Lines" section we analyze capital and cost allocation across lines. Finally, the "Concluding Remarks" section provides concluding remarks.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Financial models of insurance pricing and capital allocation were first developed by applying the principles of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM; see, e.g., Fairley, 1979; Hill, 1979) or a discounted cash flow model (see, e.g., Myers and Cohn, 1987) . Both models, however, have significant drawbacks. The CAPM applications have the basic problem that they fail to incorporate the default risk faced by policyholders as a result of their insurer's limited liability. The CAPM is also not well suited to pricing risks with heavy tails, as would be plausible for various lines of catastrophic disasters and terrorist attacks. The discounted cash flow models must apply a risk-adjusted discount rate, but the derivations of this rate incorporate neither the frictional costs of holding capital nor the default risk for policyholders.
A major advance occurred by applying option valuation methods to the questions of insurance pricing and capital allocation, starting with the monoline insurance models of Doherty and Garven (1986) and Cummins (1988) . These articles specify the default risk faced by policyholders as a put option held by the equity owners of the insurer, which provides the equity owners the option to default on claims payments due to policyholders. The value of the option depends on the range of possible outcomes for policy claims and the amount of capital held by the insurer (which is the strike price of the option). The premium paid by the policyholders is then determined as the expected losses on the policy line minus the value of the default option. This means that the ratio of the premium to expected claims is less than 1 since the claims are not always paid in full.
The extension of option pricing methods to a multiline insurer was first provided by Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998) (PCA) . Their analysis embeds the simplifying assumption that claims for all the lines are realized at the same date, which has the very useful implication that insurer default is simultaneously determined for all insurance lines. If an insurer's assets equal or exceed the actual policyholder claims, then all claims are paid in full. Whereas, if the actual claims exceed the available assets, the insurer defaults, and prorated payments are made to policyholders following a loss allocation rule. The specific rule used by PCA is that each policyholder is allocated a share of the shortfall based on the amount of her initially expected claims relative to the total of all initially expected claims. Since the shortfall shares are allocated based on the expected claims as of the initial date, we will refer to this as the ex ante rule.
The PCA ex ante allocation rule implies that the default cost relative to expected claims is constant across lines, and therefore the premium to expected claims ratio will be constant across lines. While this result is very powerful, the ex ante rule is a very special case, with the undesirable feature that the allocation of the shortfall in case of default is allocated to policyholders on the basis of only the aggregate shortfall and the ex ante expected claim on each insurance policy. This means, for example, that when the insurer faces a shortfall in available funds, policyholders with no actual claims would have to make payments to those policyholders with claims. Moreover, policyholders with small expected losses would have to make payments to other policyholders with larger expected losses. Since the ex ante expected losses on all policies are generally not observable, policyholders have no basis for validating the share of the shortfall imposed on them. Mahul and Wright (2004) note that while an ex ante expected loss allocation rule may lead to optimal risk sharing among policyholders, in practice the required crosspayments between policyholders will be difficult to enforce. 2 Instead, in our model as explained below, we apply an ex post pro rata allocation rule in which policyholders share the default shortfall in proportion to their actual claims. The result is that when the insurer defaults, policyholders without claims make no payments, and claimants always receive some payments from the insurer, in amounts proportional to their actual claim.
How to allocate capital within a multiline insurer is another important question. In the PCA model, where insurance is sold in informationally efficient, competitive, insurance markets and without costs of internal capital, insurance premiums are determined without the need to allocate capital. In our case, however, the frictional costs of holding capital make it imperative to allocate capital in order to determine the appropriate insurance premiums across lines. Two studies propose solutions to this capital allocation problem: Merton and Perold (1993) (MP) and Myers and Read (2001) (MR) . In both cases, the amount of capital to be allocated to an insurance line is determined by an experiment in which the size of each line is changed and a computation is made of the required change in capital if the insurer's risk of default is to remain unchanged.
The MP experiment, more precisely, entirely removes an insurance line from the multiline firm and then computes the appropriate reduction in the insurer's total capital requirements. The resulting reduction in capital is interpreted as the capital amount to be allocated when that line is part of the multiline firm. This procedure is then repeated for each line that the insurer covers. The MP method has the attribute that the sum of the capital allocations across all the lines will be less than the total capital required of the firm when it offers all the lines. The reason is that the overall firm receives a benefit of diversification that cannot be allocated to any of the individual lines.
The MR model also uses a marginal method to compute the capital allocation, but instead of removing each entire line from the total, they change the coverage amount of each line only by small incremental amounts. MR demonstrate that the capital allocations determined by their incremental technique satisfy the adding constraint whereby the sum of the capital allocations exactly equals the total amount of capital to be allocated. Our model, as developed below, applies the same concept as MR for determining capital allocations and takes advantage of the same adding up condition. Our results differ from MR, however, because the MR computations are based on the PCA model's ex ante allocation rule for insurer shortfalls, whereas our results are developed on the basis of our ex post allocation rule. 3 Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) are key articles in the small literature that discusses optimal insurance contracts for allocating the shortfall when an insurer defaults. For example, this is one motivation for mutual and participating insurance contracts, although these contracts then raise other issues such as limiting the diversification benefits from risk sharing. 3 Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2006) provide an alternative approach to premium setting and capital allocation when there is default risk by specifying that the demand for insurance depends in part on the "quality" of the insurer. Although this approach can provide general conclusions comparable to the PCA and MR models, it lacks the quantitative precision that is provided by the default option approach. For our article, a precise quantitative approach is essential to develop the difference between the ex ante and ex post rules for allocating default costs across insurance lines.
A COMPETITIVE MULTILINE INSURANCE MARKET
We first study the case of only one insured risk class. Consider the following oneperiod model of a competitive insurance market. At t = 0, an insurer (i.e., an insurance company) in a competitive insurance market sells insurance against a risk,L ≥ 0, 4 to an insuree. 5 The expected loss of the risk
The insurer has limited liability and holds assets A that are available to pay the realized claims at t = 1. The assets A equal the sum of the premiums paid at the beginning of the insurance period and the equity capital contributed by the insurer. At time t = 1, as long asL ≤ A, the insurer satisfies all claims by payingL to the insurees; however, ifL > A, then the insurer pays A and defaults on the shortfall (L − A). Thus, the payment is
is the payoff to the option the insurer has to default. 6 We note, in passing, that the rule can also be adjusted to take into account a deductible, D, by redefining the risk:L = max(L − D, 0). In Arrow (1974) , it was shown that having such a deductible is optimal under some conditions.
The premium paid for the insurance is the price P. For simplicity, throughout the article, the risk-free discount rate is assumed to be zero. 7 In line with PCA, we also assume that there is a friction-free complete market for risk, admitting no arbitrage. The price forL risk in the market is
where Price is a linear pricing function, which can be represented by the risk-neutral expectations operator E * [·], or with the state-price kernel,m, in the objective probability measure, 8 and we assume that E * [L] < ∞. Similarly, the price of the option to default is
We assume that there are friction costs when holding capital within an insurer, including both taxation and liquidity costs. The cost is δ per unit of capital. This means that to ensure that A is available at t = 1, (1 + δ) × A needs to be contributed at t = 0.
Since the market is competitive and the cost of holding capital is δ A, the price charged for the insurance is 
Notes:
Insurers can invest in a market for risk or in a competitive insurance market. The cost of internal capital for a period is δ, so to ensure that A is available at t = 1, (1 + δ), A needs to be reserved at t = 0, as the sum of the premiums paid by the insurees and the capital invested in the insurer. No-arbitrage and competitive market conditions imply that the price for insurance is P = δ A + P L − P Q , which is contributed by the insuree at t = 0 in return for which he receives his claim minus the default cost (L −Q) at t = 1. The amount A − P L + P Q must therefore be contributed by the insurer's shareholders. The discount rate is normalized to zero.
In words, the insurance premium equals the price of the covered risk minus the value of the default option plus the cost of internal capital.
We assume, in line with practice, that premiums are paid up front, and thus to ensure that A is available at t = 1, the additional amount of A − P L + P Q needs to be obtained by the insurer as invested capital. The total market structure is summarized in Figure 1 , which also shows how no-arbitrage pricing in the market for risk determines the price for insurance in the competitive insurance market.
It is natural to ask why insurees, recognizing that insurers impose a cost of holding capital, would not instead purchase their coverage directly in the market for risk. The answer is that we assume that insurees do not have direct access to the market for risk, or that the costs of doing so exceed the costs of internal capital for the insurer. 9 An assumption of this type is generally necessary, of course, to motivate the use of financial intermediaries compared to direct capital market access.
The generalization to the case when there are multiple risk classes is straightforward. Following PCA, we assume that claims on all the multilines are realized at the same 9 For example, if we think of the market for risk as a reinsurance market, this may be a natural constraint. A similar assumption, which would lead to identical results, is if the insuree faces costs of participating in the market for risk that are equal to or higher than the costs faced by the insurer, in which case it will be optimal to buy from the insurer. Finally, if the market is incomplete and the insurer is risk neutral, there may be no way to replicate the payoffs in the market for risk, leaving the insurance market as the sole market available to the insuree.
time t = 1. If coverage against N risks is provided by one multiline insurer, the total payment made to all policyholders with claims, taking into account that the insurer may default, is
where
price for the risks is, P def = i P i , where P i is the price for insurance against risk i, is once again on the form (1).
Our analysis so far is thus based on the following assumptions:
1. Market completeness: The market for risk is arbitrage-free and complete, such that there is a unique linear pricing operator.
Limited liability:
Insurers have limited liability.
Costly capital:
There is a cost for insurers to hold capital.
Competitive insurance markets:
Prices for insurance are set competitively.
Access to markets:
Insurees do not have direct access to the market for risk.
These assumptions, together with a rule for how payments are shared between lines in case of default, completely determine the pricing of risks as well as the capital and cost allocations across all lines, as we shall now show.
PRICING ACROSS LINES
We now turn to our primary question, how premiums are set across insurance lines. From (1), given A and δ, we know the total premium, P, but not the individual premiums, P i . We first focus on the case when the cost of holding capital is zero, δ = 0. We define line i's share of default option value, r i as
This definition immediately implies that
which motivates the terminology, since r i P Q is the difference between the actual premium and the default-free premium. We note that, when δ > 0, the premium will be higher than what is expressed in (4), since the insuree will also pay for costly capital. We discuss the general situation in the "Pricing and Cost Allocation When δ > 0" section, in which case the share of default option value in line i will be denoted by r 0 i , whereas r i will still be defined through (3). Through (4), determining the premium in line i is essentially the same as determining r i . This relies on the fact that the given amount of assets A determines the value of the overall default option P Q (recall that the claims on all lines become due at the same t = 1, with the total claims determining whether the insurer defaults).
Obviously, (1) and (3) imply that i r i = 1. We also define line i's default option value per unit of liability
and, following PCA, the premium-to-liability ratio
From (4) and (5), it follows that
We need a rule for how payments to the default option are shared between claimholders, to be able to calculate premiums. To define a general such sharing rule, we specify N functions
where (2) implies that
in all states of the world. The sharing rule is then completely characterized by (4) and (8) it follows that
There are obviously many ways to construct such a payment rule, but a minimal set of requirements is as follows.
Condition 1: Sharing rule requirements:
1. In case of no default: The payment to each insuree is exactly the amount claimed:
In case of default: The payment to each insuree is bounded above by the claim, and below by zero
: 0 ≤ F i ≤L i , for all i = 1, . . . , N.
No-claim policy: Insurees with no claims do not receive payments:L
In line with our discussion in previous sections, we focus on the ex post rule for allocating the shortfall when the insurer defaults. 10 The rule specifies that
i.e., in case of default the insurees share the total payments according to their fraction of total losses. It is easy to check that the ex post sharing rule satisfies the sharing rule requirements. Moreover, it corresponds well to the rules used in practice. 11
In this case, using the pricing operator for (11) it follows that the market price for insurance in line i is
It then follows from (4) that line i's share of default option value, under the ex post sharing rule is
and that the default option value per unit of liability is
10 We focus on contracts that are present in practice. If more general contracts are possible, it may, for example, be optimal to have ex post transfers from claimants who did not suffer any losses to claimants who did; such contracts, which would effectively turn the insuree into an insurer in some states of the world, do not seem to exist in common practice. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze why such contracts are rarely seen. 11 For example, see National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Insurer Receivership Model Act, October 2007. An ex post payout rule is also specified in the contracts offered by the California Earthquake Authority for circumstances in which the Authority has insufficient resources to pay all of its claims. See also Mahul and Wright (2004) for a discussion of alternative payoff rules and the complications created by rules other than ex post prorated payments.
Clearly, as indicated by (7) and (14), under the ex post sharing rule, we would, in general, expect the premium-to-liability ratio to vary with i.
An alternative expression for the premium-to-liability ratio, using the state price kernel kernel,m, is
Ifm is independent ofL (and thereby ofQ(A) andL i ), then
so for an insurance company with risks that are independent of market risk, premiumto-liability ratios will be low in lines for which losses are high in the states of the world when the company defaults.
Implication 1: For an insurer, insuring risk that is unrelated to market risk, define
= cov L i ,Q (A) L
• Insurance lines with losses that tend to be high in states of the world in which the insurer defaults (i.e., with high ) have low premium-to-liability ratios. • Insurance lines with losses that tend to be small in states of the world in which the insurer defaults (i.e., with low ) have high premium-to-liability ratios.
The intuition here is that the premium will be lower on lines where claims are less likely to be paid in full as the result of insurer default.
It is difficult to draw general conclusions about premium-to-liability ratios in the general case. An interesting special case of (15) is when the insurer's risk is essentially independent of market risk, in the sense thatm is almost independent ofQ (A) L , even though there are some lines with risks that are correlated with market risk. An example of risk essentially independent of market risk arises when the firm insures a large number of lines, most of which are independent of market risk, but with a few lines with risks that are correlated with market risks, adding up to a negligible part of the totalL risk. For such a company, if line i is one of the few lines with market correlated risk, e.g.,L i = αm + βξ whereξ is independent ofm, it is the case that
.
] > 0, within this class of risks, given β > 0, risks that are more correlated with market risk (have higher α) will have higher premium-toliability ratios. However, ifξ is uncorrelated withQ (A) L , the premium-to-liability ratio is the same, regardless of α and β. We summarize this in
Implication 2: For an insurer, with a portfolio of risks,L, that is essentially unrelated to market risk, given a line i, with riskL
• If > 0, given β > 0, the premium-to-liability ratio is an increasing function of α.
• If > 0, given α > 0, the premium-to-liability ratio is a decreasing function of β.
• If < 0, given β > 0, the premium-to-liability ratio is a decreasing function of α.
• If < 0, given α > 0, the premium-to-liability ratio is a increasing function of β.
• If = 0, then the premium-to-liability ratio is independent of α and β.
Thus, even in the special case when the insurer's portfolio is essentially unrelated to market risk and with a very special form ofL i , premium-to-liability ratios can be increasing or decreasing in market risk.
These implications are different than the predictions in PCA. According to PCA (Hypothesis 2, p. 609), the premium-to-liability ratio should be constant across lines. The source of these differences is that PCA's results are based on an ex ante sharing rule, with default costs allocated based on the expected claims at t = 0, whereas our results are based on the ex post sharing rule, with default cost allocations based on the actual claims at t = 1. The ex ante sharing rule is formally defined as
which implies the payment rule
By applying the pricing operator to (16), it follows that
which, via (5) and (7), implies that
and
Thus, under the ex ante sharing rule, the premium-to-liability ratio does not vary with i. Equation (19) corresponds to Equation (18) in PCA under the assumption that the discount rate and inflation are 0.
PCA assume that δ = 0, an assumption that we will relax in the subsequent analysis, leading to a more general analysis. Their model is also more general than ours in that it is dynamic and includes an inflation premium, as well as it allows for risky processes for the returns on A over time. Our model could be generalized along such lines, but the differences between our model and that of PCA are not related to these factors. For this reason, we have kept our analysis as simple as possible.
For example, under the ex post sharing rule in a dynamic setting, we would still get variation across lines in premium-to-liability ratios. In PCA, w L i in their Equation (11) describes the market value of the fraction ofQ that is allocated to line i. At t = 0, this is r i in our model. Now, the key point in our analysis is that under sharing rules other than the ex ante sharing rule (e.g., under the ex post sharing rule), this fraction will vary over time, depending on the realization of losses in the individual lines. This is why the premium-to-liability ratios are not constant across lines. In fact, under the ex post sharing rule,
, which will in general differ from its value at t = 0. These are the only two points in time at which w L i is defined in our discrete model. In a dynamic setting (e.g., in continuous time), as long as a sharing rule is used such that the w L i 's may vary over time, we would still expect the premium-to-liability ratios to vary across insurance lines. Similar arguments can be made to show that incorporating a random process for A does not affect the results.
As we have argued, we believe that, in practice, ex post sharing rules are generally used. Moreover, as shown in the example below, the ex ante rule will in general not satisfy the sharing rule requirements.
A Pricing Example
We provide a simple example that emphasizes the difference between the two sharing rules. Consider two independent risks,L 1 with 50 percent chance of being 40 and 50 Price of insurance 9 3.5 10 2.5 Value of default option 11 1.5 10 2.5 Premium-to-liability ratio 0.45 0.7 0.5 0.5 percent chance of being 0, andL 2 , with 50 percent chance of being 10 and 50 percent chance of being 0. The losses in the four states of the world are shown in Table 1 .
Further, assume that the total capital is A = 20, and that risk-neutral probabilities coincide with physical probabilities. Then, the price ofL 1 is P L 1 = 20, P L 2 = 5, and P Q = 25 percent × 20 + 25 percent × 30 = 12.5. Now, the payouts in the four states of the world can be derived by using (11), and are shown in Table 2 .
The sharing rule for the case when both insurees have claims follows from the fraction of losses beingL 1 /(L 1 +L 2 ) = 40/(40 + 10) = 80 percent, so 80 percent of the total capital of 20, i.e., 16 goes to insuree 1, and the remaining 4 to insuree 2. Thus, the value of the limited liability insurance againstL 1 is 25 × 20 + 25 percent × 16 = 9, and the value of the limited liability insurance againstL 2 is 25 × 10 + 25 percent × 4 = 3.5.
This in turn implies that the premium-to-liability ratios are
which are not equal. This is a simple example of the general property that premium-toliability ratios will generally vary across lines under the ex post sharing rule. Intuitively it is clear that the premium-to-liability ratio should be lower for the first risk, since it is more likely to have losses in the states of the world in which the insurer defaults. Therefore, the insurer tends to pay back less (relative to claims) to insuree 1, which leads to a lower premium-to-liability for risk 1. Also, the payments satisfy the sharing rule requirements (Condition 1), as is always the case under the ex post sharing rule.
We now study the same example in a setup similar to PCA, i.e., under the ex ante sharing rule. The payouts in the four states of the world follow from (16), P L 1 /(P L 1 + P L 2 ) = 80 percent, and are shown in Table 2 . Specifically, the rule indicates that insuree 2 should pay insuree 1 20 percent of the option payout of 20, i.e., 4, in the state of the world in which only insuree 1 realizes losses. This obviously violates both Assumptions 2 and 3 of the sharing rule requirement.
Implication 3:
The ex post sharing rule satisfies the sharing rule requirements, whereas the ex ante sharing rule, in general, does not.
Under the ex ante sharing rule, the premiums are P 1 = 20 − 0.8 × 12.5 = 10 and P 2 = 5 − 0.2 × 12.5 = 2.5, so the premium-to-liability ratios are equal:
in line with PCA's argument.
CAPITAL ALLOCATION ACROSS LINES
We now turn to the question of how capital, A, and costs, δ A, should be allocated between business lines. Our analysis follows the lead of MR. However, since they, like PCA, base their analysis on the ex ante sharing rule, and we apply the ex post sharing rule, our results will be different. For the time being, we continue to assume that δ = 0, in order to focus on capital allocation. A complete derivation of the results in this section is given in the Appendix.
In general, we wish to allocate the assets A among lines, A = i A i = i v i A, where v i defines the capital allocation rule. As shown in MR, any capital allocation rule, v i , (such that N i=1 v i = 1) implies a "summing up" relationship in the following sense: We study insurance portfolios i q iLi , (with weight, q i reflecting the relative amounts of risk class i) where we have, so far, assumed that q 1 = q 2 = · · · = q N = 1, but we now assume that the insurer may (marginally) change his exposure to risk in line i, e.g., by selling more insurance. At the same time, we also assume that the insurer marginally increases the capital as following the capital allocation rule defined by the v i 's. Thus, if the insurer increases exposure in line i from q i , to q i + q , then assets are increased from A to A + v i × q . Then the payout of the default option for general q's is
which generalizes Equation (2).
Now, (20) implies that
whereṼ(A) is a digital default option: it pays a dollar in the states of the world in which the insurer defaults. The price of such an instrument is P V = Price[Ṽ(A)]. We assume that the insurer defaults in at least one state of the world, so P V > 0.
The summing up relationship now states that
in all states of the world, for all q 1 , . . . , q N > 0, which is seen by summing over i in (21). The summing up rule therefore suggests that a capital allocation rule is consistent with a decomposition of the value of the option to default, at the margin.
Applying the pricing operator to both sides of (22) immediately leads to
However, this in turn implies that the marginal price of one extra unit of exposure tõ L i risk, at q 1 = q 2 = · · · = 1, is
Now, if q i increases marginally, representing a marginal increase in insurance sold to new insurees, then any other choice of
= r i P Q leads to a redistribution of value between current and new insurees, as long as the same payout rule is used for new and current insurees in line i. This intuitive fact is shown formally in the Appendix. Any such redistribution would violate the original no-arbitrage assumption, and therefore, we conclude that the capital allocation rule must be consistent with the following relation:
It is shown in the Appendix that there is bijection, {r i } ↔ {v i }, between relative asset allocations, v i , satisfying i v i = 1 and allocation of shares of default option value, r i 's, (also satisfying i r i = 1), so that given r i 's, the v i 's are uniquely defined by
We note that v i also determines the surplus allocation in line i, S i . 12 In our notation, we
So far, our arguments have been made for general sharing rules, F. Under the ex post sharing rule, the capital allocation rule reduces to
Further, for the special case in which there is only one state of the world in which the insurer defaults, the rule is particularly simple:
We summarize these results in the following.
Implication 4: If an ex post sharing rule is used, then (26) is the only capital allocation rule that does not lead to redistribution between new and old insurees with marginal expansions of insurance lines. In the special case in which the insuree defaults in only one state of the world, this capital allocation rule reduces to
This capital allocation rule differs from the ones derived in MR, who suggest that the marginal contribution to default value, d i -in our notation defined as d i
the increase in default option value for a one dollar increase in liability-should be chosen such that d i is the same across lines (see p. 554). However, via (24), and the relationship
, we have
which, under the ex post sharing rule, in general, varies with i. Under the ex ante sharing rule, since r i = P L i /P L we get d i = P Q /P L , so the equal allocation rule proposed in MR is consistent with the ex ante sharing rule. We summarize the differences between the ex post and ex ante sharing rules in Table 3 .
Pricing and Cost Allocation When δ > 0
It is straightforward to generalize our analysis to the case when δ > 0. In line with our previous allocation discussion, and following MR, capital costs should be allocated Price of default-free insurance, P
Share of default option value
Default option value per unit liability
Line surplus-to-liability ratio
according to a marginal cost pricing rule. The marginal increase in capital is v i A × dq i , so the marginal cost is δv i A × dq i , and under marginal cost pricing, v i δ A is allocated to line i. Therefore, in the case of costly capital, δ > 0, the pricing formula becomes:
is the share of the default option value, previously denoted by r i .
This form of r 0 i is in line with (10) but different from r i defined in (4), since, when δ > 0 the share of the default option value is no longer simply (P L i − P i )/P Q . The form of r 0 i is obviously the same as in (13) and (17) under the ex post and ex ante sharing rule, respectively.
The formula for r 0 i provides the r i 's we would get if δ = 0. Through (4) and (28) it follows that r i = r 0 i −
Thus, when δ > 0 two factors cause premiumto-liability ratios to vary across lines: (1) the ex post sharing rule and (2) the capital cost factor δ.
We summarize our results in the following.
Implication 5: For all δ ≥ 0, if an ex post sharing rule is used, then capital A i = v i A should be allocated to line i, where v i is defined in (26). Moreover, capital costs, δ A, should be allocated so that v i δ A is allocated to line i. Finally, the price for insurance in line i is given by (28), where r
We next show in an example how the capital allocation rule applies under the ex post sharing rule.
A Capital Allocation Example
We show in a simple example that, under the ex post sharing rule, the only capital allocation rule that is consistent with no redistribution is A i = v i A. In our example, default only occurs in one state of the world, so v i = r i . We assume that δ = 0.
We assume that there are two risks,L 1 andL 2 , and three states of the world. The state prices are π j , j = 1, 2, 3. The losses and state prices in the different states of the world are shown in Table 4 . The default-free prices for insurance are thus, P L 1 = 0.25 × 10 + 0.25 × 50 = 15, and P L 2 = 0.25 × 10 + 0.25 × 30 = 10. We assume that the total assets A = 40. In this case, when the ex post sharing rule is used, the payout in different states of the world are summarized in Table 5 .
Default thus only occurs in state 3, in which only 40 of the total losses of 80 are paid out, which in turn implies that the value of the default option is P Q = 0.25 × 40 = 10. Since the expected value of losses is P L = P L 1 + P L 2 = 15 + 10 = 25, the total surplus is S = A − P L = 40 − 25 = 15.
We first wish to understand how the total assets, A = 40, should be allocated between the two lines. We wish to find v 1 and v 2 , such that A = A 1 + A 2 , and
It follows from our previous arguments that v 1 = r 1 and v 2 = r 2 , which via (13) implies that v 1 = 0.625, v 2 = 0.375, A 1 = 25 and A 2 = 15.
The surplus allocation between the two lines is then
Finally, it is easy to check that the price of the cashflows in Table 5 is P 1 = 8.75 and P 2 = 6.25.
The allocation implied by v 1 and v 2 is important in that it provides a rule for how assets need to change if more insurance in one line is sold. For example, assume that the insurer increases his exposure to risk 2 by q = 10 percent. In this case, the allocation rule implies that the total assets need to increase by
The total assets then become A = 41.5, and A 1 = 25, A 2 = 15 + 1.5 = 16.5, and the expected loss of risk 2 is P L 2 = 1.1 × 10 = 11. The new surplus allocation is therefore S 1 = 25 − 15 = 10, S 2 = 16.5 − 11 = 5.5.
Why is this the right capital allocation rule when the ex post sharing rule is used? Because it does not change the price or risk structure of the payout to old insurees, and it prices the new risk correctly. In short, there are no value transfers between insurers when the new insurance is sold. With the new risk insured, the total losses are as shown in Table 6 and the payments are as shown in Table 7 .
The calculations of the payments are identical to the previous ones, using the ex post sharing rule. For example, for Payment 2 when j = 3, we have 16.5 = 33/(50 + 33) × 41.5. We see in Table 7 that, in all states of the world, the payments to risk 1 are identical, and that the payments to risk 2 have increased by exactly 10 percent. Thus, the price per unit risk is the same as before, and 1.5 is the "correct" amount to increase assets with under the ex post sharing rule.
It is easy to check that this is the only choice of v 1 (and thereby of v 2 = 1 − v 1 ) that has this property under the ex post sharing rule. Specifically, any other choice of v i 's will lead to a price change for the already insured risks. Therefore, value would be transfered between new and old insurees when the company scales up one insurance line. For example, the rule proposed in MR leads to redistribution under the ex post sharing rule (although it does not lead to redistribution under the ex ante rule, which is assumed in their article). Their proposed allocation is such that the option value of default (P Q = 10) is shared such that r 1 = P L 1 /P L = 15/25 = 0.6, r 2 = P L 2 /P L = 10/25 = 0.4, which by the relationship
(see Equation (A3)) leads to A 1 = 26 and A 2 = 14, and thereby to v 1 = 0.65, v 2 = 0.35. Therefore, if insurance 2 is scaled up by 10 percent, total assets should increase by The payments in different states of the world will be as in Table 8 , using identical calculations as in Table 7 , but with A = 41.4. However, this implies that the insurance againstL 1 has become worth less by the new investments in line 2, as has the value of insurance againstL 2 risk for the original insurees. There has thus been a value transfer from the old insurees to the new ones. 13 The choice of sharing rule thus determines the r i 's and thereby the v i 's uniquely.
We note that our capital allocation rule, building upon MR, is quite different from the one used in MP, and it is natural to ask how the sharing rule influences capital allocation in their analysis. The answer is that it does not. The reason is that the assumption in MP is that there are guarantees against insurance line default-in the simplest case, by the parent company to the individual business lines. Since claimholders therefore always are paid in full, sharing rules play no role in their analysis. For the same reason, sharing rules are not the source of their distinctive capital allocation rules.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article developed a model of the insurance market under the assumptions of limited liability, perfect competition, and costly capital. We focus on the determination of insurance premiums, as well as capital and cost allocations across the insurance lines.
The premium setting and capital allocations are based on the no-arbitrage, optionbased technique, first developed in the articles by PCA and MR. These articles, however, apply an ex ante rule for allocating the shortfall in claim paying capacity when the insurer defaults, which has the undesirable features that (1) it is based on the unobservable initially expected loss and (2) it may require that policyholders with small expected claims make payments to the policyholders facing large expected claims.
Instead, this article develops the solution when the shortfall created by an insurer default is shared among the claimants under an ex post, pro rata rule based on the actual realized claims. As summarized in Table 3 , the implications of such a rule-which is common in practice-are quite different compared with what is implied by an ex ante sharing rule. Specifically, premium-to-liability ratios will vary across line in a nontrivial way, and capital will be allocated according to the lines' share of a digital default option on company default.
APPENDIX

Capital and Cost Allocation
To study the capital and cost allocation questions, we look at general portfolios of risks,L q = i q iLi , with capital allocation A q = i q i A i . For the time being, we focus on the case in which δ = 0. Moreover, to avoid degenerate solutions, we restrict our attention to cases in which A > 0, and there is a positive probability for default; i.e., we assume thatL q > A q in at least one state of the world.
So far, we have studied the special case when q 1 = q 2 = · · · = q N = 1. In the general case the q's can take on other values. We assume, however, that q i > 0 for all i, so that the number of lines do not change. The general total payment rule is
This formula generalizes (2). If we apply the pricing operator to both the right-hand side and left-hand side of (A1), we get
with the obvious definition of P q , P L q and P Q q . The special case of P, P L and P Q in the main text arises when q 1 = q 2 = · · · = q N = 1. Obviously, for specific values of the q i 's, the payment rule does not depend on the specific A i 's, but only on the total capital, A q . The A i 's, however, are needed for us to understand how the total capital will change when q i changes.
We are especially interested in how a marginal change in q around q 1 = q 2 = · · · = q N = 1 will change the value of the insurance contracts. From (A2), we have
Here, I is the indicator function on the set X, I X (x) = 1 if x ∈ X and I X (x) = 0 otherwise. Equation (A4) shows how the payout of the option to default changes if the exposure toL i risk is increased by dq i and the capital at the same time is increased to by A i dq i .
Clearly,
and by applying the pricing operator to both the left-hand side and right-hand side, we get
Equation (A5) is the "summing up" rule of Myers and Read (2001) . It states that, given a capital allocation rule-defined by v 1 , . . . , v N , such that i v i = 1-the sum of the marginal changes in the value of the option to default, by marginal changes of line size in each line, equals the option value. The rule therefore suggests that a capital allocation rule is consistent with a decomposition of the value of the option to default, at the margin.
The summing up rule is valid regardless of choice of v i 's (and thereby A i 's), and it does not depend on which sharing rule F is used. Given that the insurer, when marginally scaling up the size of line i, wishes to keep the same payout for the new and old insurees in line i, the v i 's are uniquely defined. We call this the same-sharing assumption. The general form of (8) when the q's vary is
and the generalization of (9) is
for all q's, in all states of the world.
We first show that the same sharing assumption implies a unique form for v i . Assume that at q 1 = q 2 = · · · = q N , insurees have paid
for their insurances. Now, from (A3), if dq i of new insurance is sold in line i, to new insurees, these insurees will pay
THE JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE
Now, given that the new and old insurees in line i have the same rule, it is clear that the old insurees will collect:
whereas new insurees will collect
Since the new insurees through (A10) and (A11) get the same compensation, per unit of risk insured, no-arbitrage implies that they pay the same, which, via (A8) and (A9) , then there is a redistribution from old to new insurees. We make a no-redistribution assumption, and our result can be formulated as Implication 6. Under the same-sharing and no-redistribution assumptions, the v i 's in the capital allocation rule must be defined such that (A12) holds.
Implication 6 provides the precise formulation of the first part Implication 4 in the main text. Going forward, we assume that the same-sharing and no-redistribution assumptions hold.
We use (A4) to rewrite (A12) as
Here,Ṽ(A) def = I {L−A>0} , can be interpreted to be a credit default contract, which pays one dollar if the insurer defaults. The price of such a contract is P V , and since we assume that the insurer defaults in some states of the world, P V > 0.
Given an r i , there is a unique v i , such that (A13) is satisfied. This follows from the derivative of the right-hand side of (A13) with respect to v i being equal to −A × P V , which is constant and strictly less than zero. Thus, there is a bijection between r i 's and v i 's. Moreover,
and since P V > 0, this implies that i r i = 1 if and only if i v i = 1, so there is also a bijection between the {r } i 's and {v} i 's in this restricted subspace. The v i 's, in turn, immediately provides us with
From (A13), it follows that, in general,
For general sharing rules, F, there may be externalities across lines if the size of line is scaled up, since the risk structure of the whole company changes when the mix of risks change. However, it is always possible for lines to compensate each other, such that the price is fair as long as v i is chosen according to (A14). We show this as follows:
The change in payment in line i for an increase in scale of line i at q 1 = · · · = q N = 1, is:
Moreover, the change in line j of such a change in line i is and the price of this change in total payment is then, from (A4) and (A14),
This is exactly the price paid by the new insuree for the insurance. The net contribution of the insuree is thus exactly what is needed for a transfer to take place such that all insurees are fairly compensated for any change in risk that occurs when line i is scaled up. This is the transfer rule implied by F. We note that the transfer can be incorporated into the definition F, so that no transfer is needed when the up-scaling occurs.
The rule proposed in Myers and Read (2001) is to choose the v i 's such that the marginal contribution to default value of line i, d i , is the same for all i (see Myers and Read, 2001, pp. 554, 559 ). In our notation
Since i r i = 1, the only way of getting the d i = d j for all i and j is to have r i = P L i P L . This choice of r i 's is consistent with the ex ante sharing rule. From (A14), this implies that under the ex ante sharing rule,
On the contrary, under the ex post sharing rule, it follows from (13) that
The formula for v i , thus, has the same form as the formula for r i , but withṼ(A) replacingQ(A). It is also easy to check that the transfer rule between lines in case of up-scaling in line i, under the ex post sharing rule is that line j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, receives a transfer of
when risk in line i increases with dq i .
For the special case in which default occurs in only one state of the world and the ex post sharing rule is used, r i = v i for all i. This follows from the following argument. If we assume that the realization ofL i isL i = L * i in the state in which the insurer defaults and define L * = i L * i , we have
so v i is indeed equal to r i in this case. This show the second part of Implication 4 in the main text is valid.
Also, the special case of default in only one state of the world, (A15), is 0 for all i, and thus no transfers between lines are needed when the scale increases in one line. This is, for example, the case in the example in the main text.
In our terminology, the surplus-to-liability ratio of line i, s i -defined in Myers and Read (2001) -satisfies A i = (1 + s i )P L i , so
The total surplus is S = A − P L , and the surplus allocated to line i is
We stress that the interpretation of the relationship between the {v i }'s and the {r i }'s is that the {v i }'s tell us how much the insurer must increase assets if there is a marginal increase of insurance in one line. If the insurer currently sells insuranceL i , and then increases risk exposure in line i toL i (1 + q ), assets will change from A to A(1 + v i q ). With such a change, the value of the option to default increases (to a firstorder approximation) by P Q r i × q , if the insurer wishes to keep the same price and premium-to-liability ratio in new insurance within line i. Any other choice will lead to a redistribution between old and new insurees and will therefore be inconsistent with no arbitrage, as shown in the redistribution example in the main text.
For the case when δ > 0, our whole analysis goes through, with the difference that the insurees now have to pay an additional amount, δ A in total, for insurance. At the margin, if the insurer scales up insurance in line i, the extra amount v i δ A has to be contributed by the new insurees. As argued in Myers and Read (2001) , and supported by our previous analysis, it is therefore natural to allocate the costs v i δ A to line i. This rule then leads to the competitive price
for insurance in line i. The price has a marginal cost pricing interpretation: C = P L − P Q + δ A is the total cost of producing the "goods" (insurances), and
is the marginal cost of producing more "goods" in line i, which under marginal cost pricing equals the price charged for line i insurance.
